



The US and Israel Securitization of Iran's Nuclear Energy

Nassef M. Adiong¹

Abstract

The speech act made by the U.S. and Israel has been a tremendous effective instrument in convincing the world that the ambition of Iran of acquiring nuclear energy is capable to become an existential threat to the whole world. It is in this regard that the proponent had scrutinized how the U.S. and Israel securitized Iran's nuclear issue. The Copenhagen School (CS) on securitization was utilized as the paradigm, which the paper had critically analysed the process made by the U.S. and Israel. The following key points are the characters attributed from the CS thesis: (1) Iran's nuclear ambition as a security issue determined to be a social construction presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. (2) The governments of the U.S. and Israel were considered the securitizing actors. (3) The Americans and Israelis were the referent objects that possessed legitimate claim to survival and that their existences are ostensibly threatened. (4) This will be successful if the specific audiences i.e. the American and Israel political elites, businessmen and their public opinion are convinced. And (5) the most important is the language of security which is the 'speech act', this can be realized with the help of declarations, policies, speeches of leaders, and sensationalizing the issue through the medium of international media because it informs and influences the perception of reality and has direct impact on human behaviour and outcome. Therefore, the proponent concludes that base on historical facts; it shows that the U.S. and her allies were the culprit and perpetrators in giving Iran the capacity to develop nuclear energy, though a part of the blame should also go to the Shah's administration or the Pahlavi dynasty's thirst for power and greediness which were in contrast with Islamic principles and beliefs.

Key words: Copenhagen and Singaporean Securitization theories, Iran's Nuclear Energy, Israel's Speech Act, the United States' Speech Act, United Nations.

¹ PhD Candidate, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey <nassef.adiong@yahoo.com>



Caveat:

The title above is quite absurd due to the fact that in the traditional sense of defining security any country aspiring for weapons of mass destruction or WMDs, obviously nuclear used for developing weapons, is part and parcel of that nexus and is apparently a security issue; in other words it doesn't need the securitization process. It absolutely manifests the core concepts of traditional security which is akin to military, war, or what we should say high politics of hard power prior to the post-Cold War period. However, my conception of the above statement is merely a Western thought, though majority in the academia that specializes in international security accept that premise. One would ask if we can actually securitize a security issue. The answer is definitely no, because in the first place, it has been securitized and an extraordinary response was made to normalize the matter.

The nuclear energy issue of Iran is a different case because it was foreseen as an unprecedented security matter by Israel and the United States in which Iran hasn't developed a culpable force of nuclear enrichment particularly high uranium ingredient that would be used for military defence or political weapons as how the West reiterated this contention. The thin difference in securitizing Iran's nuclear energy ambition is looking at a causal link that made Iran decided to produce its own nuclear energy enrichment, which scholars have been debating on the intent and purpose of Iran. The presented assumptions were political and an economic one. Political in a sense that the proponent contends that the West and its allies perceived Iran's nuclear development as factor that will escalate regional instability and further will pose an unprecedented existential threat to them, while economical because, in an Iranian perspective, it will only be utilized for energy and electricity consumption to provide an increasing demand for their population or should I say business matters, e.g., trade.

Now, these colluding perspectives and conflicting interests will only aggravate tensions and animosity among the concerned parties which may result to hostilities and probable unwanted war(s) may break out. The delimitations that I posit is neither will focus on debates or arguments whether this matter is a traditional or non-traditional security, or in other words, a military issue or energy security, nor deal with such as hypothetical inquiries regarding the "ifs or what ifs" of the intent, motivation and purpose of Iran, i.e., weapon or energy usage. Thus it will concentrate on Iran's nuclear energy under the context of the redefined security which was presented in the Copenhagen school of thought or the so-called 'securitization framework,' deviating from the traditional to non-traditional security, the approach on securitizing Iran's ambition of nuclear energy enrichment will be in accordance of trying to understand the Iranian perspective because most of the scholarly articles have unfairly subjugated Iran as a threat which are deemed subjective and bias.

Furthermore, scarcity or lack of Iranian's published works written in English have affected the framing of every region in the world particularly the allies and some non-allies of the United States. Considering their perceptions and understandings were also influenced by published Western academic works and especially when it comes from the sensationalized news from the international correspondents or programs of CNN, BBC, Fox et al. Media is really a powerful weapon in influencing the behavior of states and/or individuals. To deeply understand the identity of Iran's aspiration for nuclear energy, the proponent will diagnostically present two asserted propositions: (1) the historical background of how Iran acquired nuclear capability vis-à-vis with its motivations, and (2) the Copenhagen securitization framework of Iran's nuclear energy to explain how Israel and the United States perceived it as an existential threat.

The Origin of Iran's Nuclear Energy and its Motivations

Iran's adversaries often told that she doesn't need to build nuclear energy because of her large reserves of gas and oil, but in the course of its existence from pre-Islamic revolution to recent, empirical studies showed that Iran needs an inconceivable amount of energy resources to supply its



increasing population and demand for electricity where she cannot rely exclusively alone on an aging oil and gas industry. To give you an example, according to Afrasiabi (p. 19, 2006) Iran has not been able to reach the production level of 5.5 million barrels per day because of American sanctions since the Islamic Republic was established. There are actually 57 out of 60 major oil fields that need major repairs and upgrading, which would require \$40 billion over 15 years.

In other words, the current production level of Iran is 3.5 million barrels a day, whereby if this trend continues it will be catastrophic to Iran's economy because it relies on oil for 80 percent of its foreign currency and 45 percent of its annual budget. Consequently, Iran has the fundamental right for securing adequate energy resources just like any other countries who aspire for development and technological advancement. In addition, from the political point of view, Iran wanted to establish its place in the international community and assert its hegemonic position in the West Asian region or more so to the Islamic world. This view might irritate the Arab world particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia though some country members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) support this postulated prism.

The reason being here is to probably enforce a well-balanced leadership in the Islamic world, e.g., establishing the three Islamic holy places into an OIC control sites and publishing academic works of universal or cosmopolitan interpretation of pristine Islam worldwide, which is not based from any cultural preferences or any schools of thought (so that the Western connotation of extremism will fade away from their schemata). And in to some extent, aspiring for a material and real ummah community by reestablishing the Caliphate system though this thinking might sound idiotic or absurd due to the ethnical and political divide in the Muslim world – Sunni v. Shia, Arab nationalism sans Khadafi's Libya v. Persian pride and Asian's distinct views on Islam, and among others.

Another motivation is that Iran is also seeking for diversifying its sources of energy which is similar to the U.S. and Russia resorting to renewable nuclear energy. Broad's article (2008) revealed that since 1985 Iran has copied a Pakistani design known as the P-1, which uses centrifuges that can be use for several applications not only for uranium enrichment but for other energy sources. In general these centrifuges can spin fast to separate all kinds of objects impurities that are incompatible i.e., mass and density. Iran's research interest to nuclear development began in the Shah's administration back in 1960s when a C.I.A. sponsored coup d'état overthrow the government of the nationalist Dr. Mossadeq's regime and established a monarchical system under the Pahlavi dynasty of Shah Reza Muhammad Pahlavi. Several bilateral agreements were fostered by Iran and the United States.

Detailed information of Iran's nuclear history can be found in the Payvand's news article of Sahimi (2003), according to his research the Tehran Nuclear Research Center of the Tehran University was the first significant nuclear facility founded in 1967, which was administered by a special agency dedicated to nuclear research - the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The facility contained a 5-megawatt reactor that can produce a ceiling point of 600 grams of plutonium annually which was actually supplied by the government of the United States of America. On 1 July 1968, Iran signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was ratified by the Majles, their parliament or congress, and it went into effect on 5 March 1970. In the Article IV of the treaty stipulated that Iran has the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and acquire equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information.

Iran has also special relationship with Israel during those times, because she is the only non-Arab country and has strong political, diplomatic and economic relations with the United States. To give you an example, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Iran have supplied the necessary oil assistance to Israel. Giving the Shah's administration a subsequent huge increase in the price of oil, thus industrial development and nuclear research programs extensively improved. Sahimi also argued that there was an influential study made by the Stanford Research Institute stating that Iran



must increase its nuclear enrichment into an electrical capacity of about 20,000-megawatt to sustain its energy demand from 1970 to 1990. The United States further encouraged Iran to expand non-oil energy base by providing several nuclear reactors.

At present, according to Frenkel (2008), Iran has thousands of centrifuges produce enriched uranium at Natanz, 250 tons of gases are stored in the tunnels of Esfahan, and a heavy water reactor that produces plutonium is situated at Arak. There is also four small nuclear research reactors supplied by China. Thus the study shows that the U.S. and Iran have a symbiotic relationship with each other, while the Iranian government was buying weapons from the U.S., Iran was providing cheap oil to the U.S. to recover herself from the high cost of oil perpetrated by the Arab-Israeli war or the so-called 'first oil shock.'

In 1975, another agreement was signed between the two governments. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) will provide educational and nuclear research trainings to Iranian engineers of the AEIO, whereby these trained engineers will work at Bushehr reactors and also Iran will buy eight nuclear reactors from the U.S. for generating electricity (Sahimi 2003). An extensive bilateral partnership was fostered on 10 July 1978 through the agreed U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Treaty which would supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran's nuclear energy program. Iran was also to receive American technology and help in searching for uranium deposits.

Iran has had established various nuclear agreements with other allies of the United States, namely:

- West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary organ of Siemens) contract on 1974, providing two nuclear reactors at Bushehr with each has a capacity of 1,200-megawatt.
- The Iranian-Indian nuclear cooperation treaty was also signed on that same year, which paradoxically speaking India is now a nuclear based power recognized by the United States.
- Another nuclear research center was established with the help of France providing the technical know-how and trainings for Iranian engineers that would be working at the Nuclear Technology Center of Esfahan. The French company Framatome proposed to build two nuclear reactors and a power plant at Darkhovin and in the city of Ahvaz with an electrical capacity of 950-megawatt.
- Even South Africa provided uranium materials to Iran in 1970s.

However, a tuning point in their diplomatic relationship on 1979 occurred that triggered a change in their foreign policies. An Islamic Revolution happened inspired by a man in the name of Khomeini that the Iranians bestowed him with titles of the 'Ayatollah' and of the 'Ruhollah' which means friend and sign of God, a highly venerated and admired person cognizant of becoming a saint which is in contrast with the Sunni traditional beliefs. And of course the infamous American hostages by Iranian militants that last more than a year. In which they (the militants) politically contend that the U.S. have also held Iran hostage like puppets of their whimsical beliefs dictating the internal affairs of the country that led to a forlorn and lost sovereignty existed for decades.

Leaving the nuclear program and research works incomplete and was paralyzed for a long time. According to Sahimi, the Bushehr-1 (reactor 1) was 90% complete and 60% of its equipment had been installed, while Bushehr-2 was 50% complete. The event also resulted to cancellations of nuclear projects initiated by the U.S. pressures to the governments of Germany, France, India and South Africa. Moreover, the two reactors at Bushehr were bombed six times (in March 1984, February 1985, March 1985, July 1986, and twice in November 1987) during the Iran-Iraq war, which the U.S. assisted Iraq by providing them anti-ballistic missiles and other conventional weapons.

According to Sahimi, the representatives from the Germany's National Reactor Inspectorate argued that before the bombings, Bushehr-1 could have been completed in about three years. However, at the time of the bombings, none of the main equipments had been installed, and in fact



two steam generators (that use the heat from the reactors to produce steam to be used in power generators) were stored in Italy, while the pressure vessel for Bushehr-1 was stored in Germany. Due to a grave and chronic shortage of electricity and a looming population explosion, President Hashemi Rafsanjani's government restarted the nuclear program. First, Iran went to Germany and approached the Kraftwerk Union to complete the Bushehr project. But the company refused due to the U.S. pressure.

Iran then asked Germany to allow Kraftwerk to ship the reactor components and technical documentation that it had paid for, citing a 1982 International Commerce Commission (ICC) ruling under which Siemens was obligated to deliver all plant materials and components stored outside Iran, but the German government still refused to do so (Sahimi 2003). Due to consistent rejections from the German government, Iran filed a lawsuit in August 1996 with the ICC, asking for \$5.4 billion in compensation for Germany's failure to comply with the 1982 ruling. However, the issue is still unsettled. (Sahimi 2003)

In the late 1980s, a consortium of companies from Argentina, Germany and Spain submitted a proposal to Iran to complete the Bushehr-1 reactor, but huge pressure by the US stopped the deal. The US pressure also stopped in 1990 Spain's National Institute of Industry and Nuclear Equipment to complete the Bushehr project. Iran also tried, unsuccessfully, to procure components for the Bushehr reactors, but her attempts were blunted by the US. (Sahimi 2003) For example, in 1993, Iran tried to acquire eight steam condensers, built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the Kraftwerk Union contract, but they were seized by the Italian government. The Czech firm Skoda Plzen also discussed supplying reactor components to Iran, but, under the US pressure, negotiations were cancelled in 1994. Iran was also not successful in her attempt to buy nuclear power reactor components from an unfinished reactor of Poland. (Sahimi 2003)

So after an unrelentless search for nuclear energy to the Western world, Iran shifted to the East by acquiring communiqués and signing treaties from Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) and China. Some of these agreements were the following based from the Sahimi's article:

- In March 1990, her first protocol on the Bushehr project with the Soviet Union was signed.
- In 1991, China provided Iran with uranium hexafluoride (a uranium compound, which is gaseous state, and used for enriching uranium) which is under the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations) safeguard.
- In 1992, Iran signed an agreement with China for building the reactors in Darkhovin, but the terms of the agreement have not yet been carried out by China. Given the proximity of the site to the border with Iraq, it is probably not prudent to proceed with that project at that particular site.
- In 1993, the AEOI and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an agreement for the construction of two Russian reactors at Bushehr, but the contract was never carried out as Iran was facing major financial problems.
- January 1995, Iran signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to finish the reactors at Bushehr. These reactors will be under the IAEA safeguards, and will be capable of producing up to 180 kg/year of plutonium in their spent fuel. The agreement called for Russia to complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years, although it is still unfinished; to provide a 30-50 megawatt thermal light-water research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for about 15 Iranian nuclear scientists per year.
- Iran and Russia also agreed to discuss the construction of a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility in Iran. However, in May 1995, the U.S. announced that it had convinced Russia to cancel the centrifuge agreement, although Russia later denied that the agreement with Iran ever existed. The light-water research reactor deal has also been cancelled.

Sahimi added that most experts believed that the completion of the Bushehr project by Russia is a highly complex task. The Kraftwerk Union has not provided any technical documents to either Iran or Russia. Since Russia plans to install a reactor, her engineers must modify what Kraftwerk Union had left behind to accommodate the Russian reactor and its support system, which differ in



many significant ways from the German reactor. For example, the structure of the steam generators in the Russian reactors is significantly different from the original German reactors. The reactor is supposed to start operating in early 2004. Currently, Iran has nuclear research centers operating in different sites: one is the Bonaab Atomic Energy Research Center (which is south of city of Tabriz), which is a research center for applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. Secondly, is the Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Karaj (near Tehran) which is run by the AEOI. (Sahimi 2003) None of these are considered to be for military applications.

Iran's Nuclear Energy: An existential threat to the U.S. and Israel's security?

In its broadest and academic term, "security" has been defined contemporarily by Buzan and Waever (1998) as being that special type of politics in which specified developments are socially constructed threats, having an existential quality to cover values and/or assets of human collectivities and leading to a call for emergency measures. In conceptualizing the securitization theory they have developed a paradigm that would dominate the entire security studies in the academia, this is the Copenhagen Securitization (CS) framework. It contends that securitization, is not just a call for political priority, but if need be, for permission to break the normal rules of politics i.e. by using force, by taking executive powers, or by imposing secrecy.

Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006, p. 23) added that it is when the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics and may refers to the classification of and consensus about certain phenomena, persons or entities as existential threats requiring emergency measures. They explained that securitization is thus mostly about calls for closure against things perceived as existentially threatening and further, the consensual establishment of threat needs to be sufficient so as to produce substantial political effects. What constitutes an existential threat is thus viewed by CS stating that it depends on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a danger to security. Threat may be classified into three according to Solidum et al (p. 28): actual, potential, and fictitious.

- 1) Actual threats are existing conditions that can, at any moment, reduce security;
- 2) potential threats are conditions tending to reduce security but are not transformable to actual threats due to some constraints; and
- 3) fictitious threats are conditions that are perceived to reduce security but do not really exist.

Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 21-23) asserted that the CS, a body of research mainly associated with the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, has developed a relevant instrument to conceptualize the theory of securitization. This theory outlines the political nature of "doing" security and challenges the traditional approach to security - concerned with identifying and dealing with supposedly self-evident threats - and introduces a social-constructivist perspective that considers how problems are transformed into security issues. Securitization is the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue and results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it. This transformation has relevant implications; through the label "security" problems are turned into existential threats that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Haacke (2007, p. 3) simply puts that to securitize an issue is to present as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.

In Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 23-24), they were five key terminologies in the process of securitization which was presented by CS for security studies, namely: security, securitizing actors, referent objects, specific audience, and the speech act.

▪ *Security*. A socially constructed concept about survival whereby an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.



▪ *Securitizing Actors.* These are governments, international organizations or civil society actors that securitize an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of specific referent object.

▪ *Referent Objects.* These can be individuals and groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like states (military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened.

▪ *Specific Audience.* The act of securitization is only successful and complete once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince a specific or significant audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is/are existentially threatened.

▪ *Speech Act.* This is an important part in the process of securitization. According to Wæver (1998), with the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the word "security" is the act and second, the utterance is the primary reality. Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 24) further explained that speech informs and influences our perception of reality and has a direct impact on human behaviour and outcome.

We will now designate the classifications of the Copenhagen Securitization framework to explain how the United States and Israel perceived Iran’s nuclear energy as a threat to their security.

Security Threat (unprecedented and existential)

Iran’s ambition for nuclear energy has been perceived by many Western secondary sources like books, journals, periodicals, etc. as an existential threat to their survival. One example is a special program hosted by Chris Wallace of the Fox news, titled “Iran: The Nuclear Threat,” that aired on 8 May 2005. (Afrasiabi 2006, p. 101). It is simply an explicit manifestation on how bias and subjective was the report is. Another was the utterance declared by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon calling that behind an Iranian nuclear energy was a bomb, thus making it the biggest “existential threat” to the Jewish state. Consequently, if we will going to base it what kind of threat they have established, the proponent would say that it’s a small margin between potential to fictitious threat because all that they have conceived were always on what they think it is subject to their preconditions and norms concomitant with what secondary sources would tell them sans understanding and analyzing the Iranian perspective.

Securitizing Actors or Agents

It is pretty obvious that the primal agents who initiated the threats were states like the United States of America and Israel. And to some extent, non-state actors are also being considered which are the United States Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU). Before, there was a so-called EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) which was negotiating with Iran to come up with a viable offer that would make Iran halt their ambition of attaining nuclear energy, however, now, the diplomacy did not prosper which of course resulted to EU sanctions on Iran’s economy.

Referent Objects

These are the national sovereignty and political security of the United States, Israel and its allies that are at stake for their legitimate claims on survival. However, if we’re going to analyze the situation it’s the other way around ... that Iran’s sovereignty and inalienable right to nuclear energy which are threatened, Like for example, there were circumventing reports that Israel will attack Iran’s nuclear sites even without the U.S. consent because according to their intelligence data, Iran will have nuclear weapons on 2010 (Frenkel 2008).

Another distinct example was that the United States was not looking for an excuse to go to war with Iran according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates (AFP 2007). This was in line with their



intelligence reports that Iran's Quds Force, an elite branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was training Iraqi extremists and supplying them with armor piercing bombs and other conventional weapons. Further asserting that there was no doubt that the elite Al-Quds Force was behind with the powerful, new improvised explosive devices (IEDS) killing U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

Specific Audiences

As we have reiterated that the 'speech act' will not be successful if specific groups were not convinced. Public opinion is one of the instruments that measure the success of the speech act. The groups that the proponent was specifying at were the politicians or political elites, military officials, and some civilian sectors of the United States, Israel and to some extent UNSC members and the EU3.

Several Western media reports and academic sources have pointed out that their existence were being threatened by the ambition of Iran acquiring for nuclear energy because they contend that the it may possibly be converted to arsenals thus wiping them off the map. Thus most reports would tend and equate it to the comment made by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he visited Columbia University, though this report was proportionately taken out of context and made sensationalized all over America and its allies.

Speech Acts

This is the most important part of the securitization theory because it legitimized the claim of an existential threat through declarations and policies implemented by the securitizing actors. There were several executive orders implemented by the United States and Israel in containing and sanctioning Iran's economy due to their claim of Iran's nuclear energy will be used for WMD. These sanctions have had freeze Iranian financial assets in several Western banks and sanction whatever companies who will provide nuclear technology, technical know-how, and other assistance in helping Iran build nuclear energy,

Other sanctions in the form of resolutions were also made particularly by the United Nations Security Council:

- UNSC Resolution 8792 (2006), Security Council demands Iran suspend Uranium enrichment by 31 August 2006 or face possible economic and diplomatic sanctions.
- UNSC Resolution 8928 (2006), the Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium enrichment, unanimously adopting Resolution 1737 (Measures will be lifted if Iran suspends Activities; report due from Atomic Energy Agency on compliance within 60 Days).
- UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), Sanctions imposed on Iran for nuclear enrichment.
- UNSC Resolution 1803 (2007), they also welcomed agreement between Iran, Atomic Energy Agency to resolve outstanding issues on Iran's nuclear program.
- UNSC Resolution 1747(2007), Further sanctions imposed on Iran for nuclear enrichment.
- UNSC Resolution 8980 (2007), Security Council toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo, with unanimous adoption of Resolution 1747 (Further steps promised if no compliance reported by IAEA in 60 days; Iran's Foreign Minister says pressure, intimidation will not change policy).
- UNSC Resolution 9268 (2008), they tightens restrictions on Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, and states inspect cargo.

Concluding Remarks

Therefore, the proponent can conclude that base on the historical facts; it shows that the U.S. and her allies were the culprit and perpetrators in giving Iran the capacity to develop nuclear energy, though a part of the blame should also go to the Shah's administration or the Pahlavi dynasty's thirst for power and greediness which were in contrast with Islamic principles and beliefs. The proponent will also have to saliently acknowledge that when Iran restarted its nuclear program on mid-1980s, the United States and her allies have been given every opportunity to participate in the development



and construction of nuclear reactors in Iran, which would have provided them with significant control on the reactors and their products, but they have always refused to do so.

It is really interesting how the U.S. et al securitize Iran's nuclear energy as an existential threat to their security. A report was published in *Philippine Daily Enquirer* (2007) that the U.N. Atomic watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei said that he had no evidence that Iran was building nuclear weapons and accused the U.S.' and its allies' leaders of adding "fuel to the fire," after they have inspected Iran's nuclear sites. It is the reason that AEIA will only provide technical point of view based on facts and does not want to be associated with some political bickering to expand their interest in the ambit of politicization. There was also a fundamental ideological objection to weapons of mass destruction, including a religious decree issued by the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibiting the development, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. Since then nuclear enrichment have only been for research and technological development i.e., electricity consumption and other energy products.

If you will analyze the History of Iran, it gives a perfect illustration of its geo-strategic outlook. Over the past 250 years, Iran has not waged a single act of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it initiated any hostilities. In to-to, the study needs more empirical base orientation in trying to give a profound Iranian perspective against the elaborative study done by the Orientals or American neoconservatives. This is not actually presenting a one-dimensional side or defending Iran aspiration for nuclear energy but to give another perspective and paradigm from the dominant literature that stipulates Iran is a threat to the ideals and survival of the Western traditional beliefs and security of the world.

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